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SPECIAL EDUCATION IN ADULT
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES:
A RIGHT NOT A PRIVILEGE
Melissa Edelson*
A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential
to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the
Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.1
– California Constitution art. IX §1

I. INTRODUCTION
Although public education is not a constitutional right
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution,2 it is a “uniquely fundamental
personal interest in California.”3 Before 1975, however, children
with disabilities were often denied a public education due to a lack of
resources, understanding, or services.4 With the passage of the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) in 1975, those
individuals are now assured access to a free appropriate public
education that emphasizes special education and related services
(“special education”).5 Yet despite constitutional and statutory
mandates, a nationwide class of individuals is being denied
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. History, 2014,
George Washington University. I would like to thank Professor Michael Smith for suggesting this
topic and for providing invaluable advice and guidance throughout the writing process. I would
also like to thank The Youth Justice Education Clinic at Loyola Law School for its work
educating law students on how to effectively advocate for youths’ rights in educational settings.
1. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
2. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1250 (Cal. 1992).
3. Id. at 1249.
4. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (2004) (detailing the situation before the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act was enacted).
5. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1487 (2004).
Related services includes “such developmental, corrective, and other supportive services . . . as
may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education.” Related
services may include, among other things, transportation, speech-language therapy, and
psychological therapy. Id. § 1401(26).
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meaningful access to the education to which it is entitled.6
The IDEA legally entitles youth7 incarcerated in adult
correctional facilities who meet certain prerequisites to special
education.8 Specifically, they must either (a) have been previously
identified as having a disability, (b) have received special education
in the past, or (c) have an individualized education program (“IEP”)
in place.9 This legal right may be terminated only when the
individual has either received a high school diploma or reached the
age of twenty-two.10
Yet, despite a federal mandate providing special education to
individuals who meet statutory requirements, adult correctional
facilities are skirting their responsibility to provide appropriate
special education to qualified inmates.11 For example, in 2011 it was
estimated that approximately 61,000 individuals under age twentyone were incarcerated on any given day in the United States.12 Other
estimates indicate that this number is much higher.13 Nonetheless,
6. Liz Ryan, Youth in the Adult Criminal Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., 10
(Oct. 2012), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/policybriefs/policyreform/FR_YAC
JS_2012.pdf. (“Youth have limited access to education while in adult jails and prisons. According
to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) . . . only 11% of adult jails
provide special education services.”).
7. For clarity, the terms “youth” and “juvenile” are used throughout this Note to describe
legal minors as well as those individuals below the age of twenty-two who are eligible to receive
special education under the IDEA.
8. Melody Musgrove & Michael K. Yudin, “Dear Colleague” Letter on the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act for Students with Disabilities in Correctional Facilities, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC. 1 (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/
guid/correctional-education/idea-letter.pdf.
9. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(2)(ii) (2008); see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(2) (2004).
10. 34 C.F.R. § 300.102. Individuals are entitled to receive special education until they reach
the age of twenty-two, unless they become twenty-two years of age while participating in an
educational program. In that case, the individual may continue his or her participation in the
program for the remainder of the current fiscal year. Thus, some statutes state the eligibility cut
off as twenty-one and others specify the cut off age as twenty-two. See CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 56026(c)(4) (West 2003); Patricia J. Guard, Letter to State Directors of Special Education on
Implementing the Funding Formula Under the IDEA, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 9, 2005),
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2005-1/osep0507funds1q2005.pdf.
11. See James J. Stephan, Census of State and Federal Correctional Facilities, 2005,
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. 5 (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=530.
12. Lois M. Davis et al., How Effective Is Correctional Education, and Where Do We Go
from Here?, RAND CORP. 21 (2014), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_
reports/RR500/RR564/RAND_RR564.pdf. Estimates of the number of individuals incarcerated in
adult correctional facilities that are entitled to special education under the IDEA vary from source
to source. There is very little research or statistics on this population.
13. Jason Ziedenberg, You’re an Adult Now: Youth in Adult Criminal Justice Systems,
NAT’L INST. OF CORRS. 2 (Dec. 1, 2011), http://static.nicic.gov/Library/025555.pdf. (“It has been
estimated that nearly 250,000 youth under age 18 end up in the adult criminal justice system
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the Bureau of Justice Statistics found that out of 1,821 adult
correctional facilities under state and federal authority, only 667 of
them provided special education services.14 Reoccurring issues with
overcrowding, frequent movement of individuals, a lack of qualified
teachers, and an inability to obtain student records in a timely
manner, compound this problem.15 As such, while youth are required
to receive special education services wherever they are incarcerated,
there is no information on the quality of such services.16 With less
than forty percent of adult correctional facilities having special
education programs in place, it is likely that many youth incarcerated
in such facilities are not receiving the services to which they are
entitled.17
Several key IDEA provisions make this avoidance possible.18 In
particular, four primary provisions exempt adult correctional
facilities from providing a free appropriate public education to
school-aged youth in their facilities.19 The first situation occurs when
providing such services would be inconsistent with state law or
practice.20 The second situation occurs when the individual in
question was not previously identified as a child with a disability
before placement in the adult correctional facility.21 Third, the
child’s IEP team may modify the child’s IEP or placement if the

every year.”).
14. Stephan, supra note 11.
15. Richard A. Mendel, No Place for Kids: The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration,
ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND. 25 (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-NoPlace
ForKidsFullReport-2011.pdf.
16. Ziedenberg, supra note 13, at 6.
17. Stephan, supra note 11.
18. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004) (allowing states to limit the provision of special
education if it would be inconsistent with state law or practice); id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(exempting adult correctional facilities from the child find obligation in limited circumstances),
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012) (allowing modifications of an incarcerated individual’s IEP in
certain circumstances), id. § 1416(h) (limiting the withholding power of the Secretary of
Education in the context of adult penal institutions).
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004); id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B)
(2012); id. § 1416(h).
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004) (“The obligation to make a free appropriate public
education available to all children with disabilities does not apply with respect to children . . . 18
through 21 in a State to the extent that its application to those children would be inconsistent with
State law or practice.”).
21. See id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (The obligation to provide special education does not apply to
children “aged 18 through 21 . . . who, in the educational placement prior to their incarceration in
an adult correctional facility [] were not actually identified as being a child with a disability . . . or
[] did not have an individualized education program.”).
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State demonstrates “a bona fide security or compelling penological
interest that cannot otherwise be accommodated.”22 Lastly, and
perhaps most damaging, the federal government is statutorily limited
in what penalties it may enact for IDEA noncompliance in the adult
correctional facility context.23
While the above exceptions are legally permissible under the
IDEA, many adult correctional facilities stretch these provisions
beyond their intended scope and capacity by denying the provision of
special education altogether to youth within their institutions.24
Indeed, researchers have found that “[e]ducational programming
available for school-age youth incarcerated in adult penal institutions
is currently woefully inadequate.”25 Not only is this denial
inconsistent with the IDEA’s overall purpose and California’s
constitutional interpretation of public education as a fundamental
right, but it also disregards the advantages that can be obtained
through educating at-risk youth incarcerated in adult correctional
facilities.26
Part II of this Note examines the constitutional and statutory
provisions that should, in theory, allow all youth incarcerated in adult
correctional facilities access to special education. Part III explores
the mechanisms that adult correctional facilities use to avoid
providing special education to youth within their institutions. Part IV
explains how legal minors end up in the adult criminal justice system
and the negative educational outcomes associated with youth in adult
22. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012) (“If a child with a disability is convicted as an adult
under State law and incarcerated in an adult prison, the child’s IEP Team may modify the child’s
IEP or placement . . . if the State has demonstrated a bona fide security or compelling penological
interest that cannot otherwise be accommodated.”).
23. Id. § 1416(h). For IDEA violations that occur in adult jails and prisons, the federal
government may only withhold funding from the agency responsible for providing special
education in an amount proportionate to the number of eligible students in the adult correctional
facilities for which the agency is responsible.
24. As of 2000, only 40% of state prisons, 60% of federal prisons, 22% of privately funded
prisons, and 11% of local jails provided special education programs in their facilities. Caroline
WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EDUCATION AND
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 4 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf; Stephan,
supra note 11.
25. Christine D. Ely, Note, A Criminal Education: Arguing for Adequacy in Adult
Correctional Facilities, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 795, 796 (2008).
26. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2004) (discussing the overall purpose of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act); see also Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1250 (Cal. 1992) (“[F]or
California purposes, education remains a fundamental interest which [lies] at the core of our free
and representative form of government.”).
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correctional facilities. Part V discusses potential solutions for the
lack of special education programs in adult correctional facilities.
Most importantly, the IDEA must be amended in order to close the
loopholes that adult penal institutions use to limit the provision of
special education in their institutions.27
II. THE RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION IN EXISTING LAW
There is a divide in California between the right to public
education created by the California Constitution and state statutes,
and the actual enforcement of those laws in adult correctional
facilities. Under the California Constitution—and cases interpreting
it—education is a fundamental right. Moreover, the IDEA affirms
that youth are entitled to special education. However, California
courts have not yet affirmatively considered the constitutional right
to special education for individuals incarcerated in adult prisons. In
contrast, the Washington Supreme Court has decided that
incarcerated individuals above the age of eighteen are not entitled to
protections under the IDEA.28 It is unclear whether the California
Supreme Court will follow Washington’s precedent. Nevertheless, a
general examination of California law, and of the IDEA in its
entirety, demonstrates the divide between the IDEA’s overall
purpose and the way it is being enforced today.
A. The California State Constitution
While the Constitution does not guarantee youth the right to a
public education, almost all states have constitutional provisions
recognizing the importance of public education for all children
within their state.29 Moreover, “every state has compulsory school
27. There has been much research, advocacy, and scholarship centered on juveniles
incarcerated in juvenile facilities. The same cannot be said for juveniles incarcerated in adult
correctional facilities. For scholarship on the status of special education in juvenile facilities, see
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING HIGHQUALITY EDUCATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SECURE CARE SETTINGS (2014), http://www2.ed.
gov/policy/gen/guid/correctional-education/guiding-principles.pdf; BARRY HOLMAN & JASON
ZIEDENBERG, JUST. POL’Y INST., THE DANGERS OF DETENTION: THE IMPACT OF
INCARCERATING YOUTH IN DETENTION AND OTHER SECURE FACILITIES (2006), http://www.
justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-11_rep_dangersofdetention_jj.pdf; Stefanie Low, Comment,
Improving the Education of California’s Juvenile Offenders: An Alternative to Consent Decrees,
57 UCLA L. REV. 275 (2009).
28. See Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 699–701 (Wash. 2000).
29. Elizabeth Cate, Teach Your Children Well: Proposed Challenges to Inadequacies of
Correctional Special Education for Juvenile Inmates, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 12
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attendance laws.”30 For California, this means that children ages six
through eighteen are required to attend some form of schooling.31
And, in exchange for mandatory attendance, California courts have
established that “[p]ublic education is an obligation, which the state
assumed by the adoption of the Constitution . . . . [and] the
opportunity to receive the schooling furnished by the state must be
made available to all on an equal basis.”32
Moreover, the Supreme Court has found that a property interest
in education exists where states have mandated both the maintenance
of a free, common school system and compulsory education. 33 This
property right, the Court has found, is protected by due process.34
Thus, since California’s constitution and educational statutes do not
specifically exempt incarcerated youth in their provisions, in theory,
all incarcerated youth should enjoy the same guarantee of education
as all other children in the state.35 In that regard, “[f]rom a textual
standpoint, the applicable court precedents . . . that define the
contours of the right to education should also apply,” to students in
correctional contexts.36
Although California case law remains silent on the subject, other
states that have traditionally advanced public education as a
fundamental right have, in the same stroke, denied this right to
juveniles incarcerated in adult correctional facilities.37 For example,
the Washington Supreme Court in Tunstall v. Bergeson38 held that
the constitutional right to basic and special education did not apply to
students incarcerated in adult facilities that were above the age of

(2010); see also CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (stating the legislative policy behind the constitutional
prerogative); Jennifer A.L. Sheldon-Sherman, The IDEA of an Adequate Education for All:
Ensuring Success for Incarcerated Youth with Disabilities, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 227, 231 (2013).
30. Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 231.
31. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2003) (“Each person between the ages of 6 and 18
years not exempted . . . is subject to compulsory full-time education.”).
32. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Cal. 1992).
33. Ely, supra note 25, at 817.
34. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (“[T]he State is constrained to recognize a
student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by
the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to
the minimum procedures required by that Clause.”).
35. Katherine Twomey, Note, The Right to Education in Juvenile Detention Under State
Constitutions, 94 VA. L. REV. 765, 795 (2008).
36. Id.
37. See Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 699–701 (Wash. 2000).
38. Id.
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eighteen.39 Thus, while minors held in Washington correctional
facilities are entitled to an education, students above the age of
eighteen are denied this right based on the Court’s strict
interpretation of the term “children.”40
Unlike Washington, California courts have yet to hear a case
regarding the constitutional right to education for individuals
incarcerated in adult prisons.41 However, they have unequivocally
found that individuals incarcerated in juvenile facilities are
constitutionally entitled to basic and special education.42 It is unclear
whether California courts will follow Washington’s Tunstall
example, or whether they will unambiguously extend California’s
constitutional right to special education beyond juvenile facilities.43
B. The IDEA
The IDEA, originally titled the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975,44 was enacted in order to improve educational
results for children with disabilities.45 Before its enactment, children
with disabilities across the country were unable to meaningfully
acquire public education because they “did not receive appropriate
educational services,”46 or else were “excluded entirely from the
public school system and from being educated with their peers.”47
Thus, the IDEA promises that all students with disabilities “are
entitled to receive a free appropriate public education that
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
39. Id. at 701 (“[T]he common understanding of the definition of ‘children’ for most
purposes in Washington, including education, includes individuals up to age 18. Consequently,
we hold that the term ‘children’ under article IX includes individuals up to age 18.”).
40. Id. at 710 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (“By manipulating the definition of ‘child,’ the
majority denies Washington children their constitutional right to education and equal protection
of the law.”).
41. But see L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 778 (Cal. 2013) (finding that
individuals under the age of twenty-two, incarcerated in county jails, are entitled to special
education provided that they meet all IDEA requirements).
42. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224.71(n) (West 2016); see Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929,
951 (Cal. 1977) (“education is a fundamental interest”); Anna L. Benvenue, Comment, Turning
Troubled Teens into Career Criminals: Can California Reform the System to Rehabilitate Its
Youth Offenders?, 38 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 33, 43 (2007).
43. Garcia has already extended the right to special education to individuals below the age
of twenty-two that are incarcerated in county jails. 314 P.3d at 767, 772–73.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006).
45. Id. § 1400(c)(3).
46. Id. § 1400(c)(2)(A).
47. Id. § 1400(c)(2)(B).
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their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living.”48
Under the IDEA, a state is entitled to receive federal financial
assistance for educating students with disabilities, ages three through
twenty-one.49 In order to receive these funds, the state must
implement and maintain policies and procedures that ensure the
provision of a free appropriate public education50 in the least
restrictive environment51 to all students with disabilities residing
within its boundaries, subject to some important exceptions.52 In
practice, states must have procedures in place to find and assess
potential individuals,53 determine whether a student is eligible for
special education, and create and implement individualized education
programs that conform to IDEA requirements.54
Furthermore, the IDEA applies to all eligible students within
states that receive federal funding support for the education of
students with disabilities.55 The U.S. Department of Education
recently reiterated this point in a Dear Colleague Letter56 that stated:
Absent a specific exception, all IDEA protections apply to
students with disabilities in correctional facilities . . . the
fact that a student has been charged with or convicted of a
crime does not diminish his or her substantive rights or the
procedural safeguards and remedies provided under the

48. Id. § 1400(d)(1).
49. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A) (2004).
50. The term “free appropriate public education,” as defined by 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2004),
is special education and related services provided under public supervision and at public expense
that conform with state educational standards and the individual’s individualized education
program (“IEP”).
51. The least restrictive environment, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2004), means that,
“To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or
private institutions or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled.”
52. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2004); see id. § 1401(3) (defining “child with a disability”).
53. This process is commonly referred to as “child find.” See id. § 1412(a)(3) (2004).
54. Id. § 1412(a) (2004). An “individualized education program” (“IEP”) means “a written
statement for each child with a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance
with section 20 USC § 1414(d).” Id. § 1401(14).
55. Id. § 1412(a); see also L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 772 (Cal. 2013)
(“One of the conditions for a state’s receipt of federal funding under the IDEA is its assurance
that a ‘free appropriate public education’ is available to all qualified students residing in the
state.”).
56. 20 U.S.C. § 1406(e) (2004). Dear Colleague Letters are “informal guidance . . . not
legally binding” that represent “the interpretation by the Department of Education of the
applicable statutory or regulatory requirements.” Id.
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IDEA.57
Therefore, students in correctional facilities are entitled to the
provision of a free appropriate public education under the IDEA.58
However, as the Dear Colleague letter notes, “not all students with
disabilities are receiving the special education and related services to
which they are entitled,” in correctional facilities.59
III. IDEA LOOPHOLES FOR THE PROVISION OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
TO POTENTIALLY ELIGIBLE INMATES
There are several IDEA provisions that modify the rights of
individuals incarcerated in adult correctional facilities without giving
adult penal institutions the flexibility to deny special education
altogether.60 These provisions include: exclusion from state and
district assessments,61 termination of the right to transitional services
if the inmate will not be released before their IDEA eligibility
ceases,62 and cessation of the right to a free appropriate public
education in the least restrictive environment.63 There is no doubt
that the preceding provisions are harmful to the overall quality and
adequacy of special education in adult correctional facilities.
However, the IDEA provisions discussed below are commonly used
by adult correctional facilities to avoid providing special education
altogether to eligible students.
A. If the Provision of Special Education Would Be
Inconsistent with State Law or Practice
Under the IDEA, the obligation to provide a free appropriate
public education to students with disabilities does not apply to
individuals aged eighteen through twenty-two if it “would be
inconsistent with State law or practice.”64 Generally, courts have
interpreted this exception to permit states to limit the guarantee of
special education to entire age ranges, as opposed to particular

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1.
Id.
Id.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(A)(i)–(ii), 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012).
Id. § 1414(d)(7)(A)(i) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(i) (2012).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(A)(ii) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(ii) (2012).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)(ii)(2)(ii) (2012).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004).
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subsets in age groups.65 Accordingly, under this exception, states
cannot limit the provision of special education to students aged
eighteen through twenty-two who are incarcerated in correctional
facilities without limiting the provision of special education to all
students aged eighteen through twenty-two in general.66
Despite this statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court of
Washington, in Tunstall, held that students in adult correctional
facilities over the age of eighteen were ineligible for the provision of
special education under the IDEA.67 The court reasoned that the
inmate class was outside “the common school system,” and thus not
covered under Washington’s basic and special education statutes.68
Consequently, the provision of special education to these individuals
under the IDEA would be “inconsistent with State law or practice,”
and thus inmates over eighteen years old were not guaranteed such
services under the IDEA.69
Tunstall has been widely criticized as contrary to IDEA
requirements.70 However, the Supreme Court denied review of the
decision, thereby leaving open a mechanism for states to deny the
provision of special education to students incarcerated in adult
facilities.71 Nevertheless, several California education statutes and a
California Supreme Court case suggest that California courts will not
follow Tunstall.72
For example, section 56000 of the California Education Code
states:
It is the . . . intent of the Legislature to ensure that all
individuals with exceptional needs are provided their rights
to appropriate programs and services . . . under the federal
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act . . . . [and] that
this part does not abrogate any rights provided to
65. Thomas A. Mayes, Denying Special Education in Adult Correctional Facilities: A Brief
Critique of Tunstall v. Bergeson, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 193, 201 (2003).
66. Id.
67. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 706 (Wash. 2000). To be clear, this holding does not
extend to students aged eighteen to twenty-two that are not incarcerated.
68. Id. at 698–99.
69. Id. at 706.
70. Lindsay McAleer, Note, Litigation Strategies for Demanding High Quality Education
for Incarcerated Youth: Lessons from State School Finance Litigation, 22 GEO. J. POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 545, 563 (2015); Ely, supra note 25, at 815–17; see Mayes, supra note 65, at 194.
71. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 532 U.S. 920 (2001).
72. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 768 (Cal. 2013); see CAL. EDUC. CODE
§ 56000 (West 2003).
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individuals with exceptional needs.73
The California legislature intended to incorporate the full rights and
protections set forth in the IDEA.74 The IDEA allows for the
provision of special education to students in adult correctional
facilities, provided they meet certain prerequisites.75 As such,
California should be providing those same services to individuals
incarcerated in California adult correctional facilities.
Additionally, in Los Angeles Unified School District v. Garcia,76
the California Supreme Court unequivocally ruled that eligible
students not exempted by IDEA prerequisites are entitled to receive a
free appropriate public education in California county jails.77 Garcia
raised the issue of which agency is responsible for providing special
education to individuals incarcerated in county jails.78 The California
Supreme Court held that the responsibility for providing these
services is governed by section 56041 of the California Education
Code, which states:
[I]f it is determined by the individualized education
program team that special education services are required
beyond the pupil’s 18th birthday, the district of residence
responsible for providing special education and related
services to pupils between the ages of 18 to 22 years,
inclusive, . . . [is] the last district of residence in effect prior
to the pupil’s attaining the age of majority . . . as long as
and until the parent or parents relocate to a new district of
residence.79
Although the California Legislature has specifically delineated the
entities responsible for providing special education in similar
institutional settings, such as juvenile court schools, it “has not
73. EDUC. § 56000.
74. Id. The California legislature’s intention is to provide California students with the same
rights that they would have under the IDEA; they wish to neither abrogate nor enlarge these
rights. See id.
75. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1.
76. 314 P.3d 767 (Cal. 2013).
77. Id. at 772 (“In the present matter, there is no dispute that, under the IDEA and the
California statutes that implement its policies . . . Garcia[] was entitled to continue to receive a
[free appropriate public education] while incarcerated in county jail: He was under the age of 22
years, had not received a high school diploma or otherwise met prescribed goals, and, prior to his
incarceration, he had been identified as a disabled student and had an individualized educational
program.”).
78. Id. at 773.
79. EDUC. § 56041.
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adopted a similar narrow statute applicable to the county jail
setting.”80 In its absence, the agency responsible for providing
special education in the county jail setting is the local educational
agency in which the incarcerated student’s parent resides.81
Accordingly, Garcia is significant for two reasons. First, it
explicitly states that youth incarcerated in California jails are entitled
to special education under the IDEA.82 This proposition extends to
all qualified youth in adult correctional facilities83—basic rights
under the IDEA do not end when a juvenile is incarcerated in an
adult correctional facility.84 Consequently, it is unlikely that a
California court will find the provision of special education to
individuals aged eighteen through twenty-two “inconsistent with
state law or practice.”85
Second, Garcia assigns responsibility for the provision of
special education for youth in county jails to the school districts
where their parents reside.86 This delegation raises logistical
questions as to how school districts will work together with each
other, and with the correctional institution, to provide a free
appropriate public education to students under their responsibility.87
With the issue raised, there may be more attention on if, and to what
standard, special education is provided to youth in adult correctional
facilities.
B. Exemption from Certain Child Find Procedures
Another exception to the general guarantee of a free appropriate
public education for students with disabilities specifically targets
80. Garcia, 314 P.3d at 780.
81. Id. at 775.
82. Id. at 780 (“An individual with a qualifying disability who is between the ages of 18 and
22 years and has met certain specified prerequisites is entitled to continue his or her special
education program while incarcerated in a county jail.”).
83. Id. at 772. The Garcia court discusses only two exceptions to the general special
education entitlement: either the student has received a regular high school diploma or the
student, before his or her incarceration, was not identified as a child with a disability or did not
have an IEP. Id. Thus, if the individual has been previously identified as a child with a disability
and has not yet received a high school diploma, the CA Supreme Court implicitly states that he or
she is entitled to the provision of special education in adult penal institutions. Id.
84. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1 (“[T]he fact that a student has been charged
with or convicted of a crime does not diminish his or her substantive rights or the procedural
safeguards and remedies provided under the IDEA to students with disabilities . . . .”).
85. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004).
86. Garcia, 314 P.3d at 774.
87. Id. at 779.
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individuals aged eighteen through twenty-two in adult correctional
facilities.88 Under the IDEA, if individuals were not previously
identified as having a disability or did not have an IEP in their
previous educational placement, they are not entitled to receive
special education in adult correctional facilities.89
In effect, this provision exempts adult penal institutions from
performing child find procedures for inmates between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-two.90 However, as the U.S. Department of
Education makes clear, “States must make [free appropriate public
education] available to students with disabilities in adult prisons who
do not fall into that exception. Therefore, States and local
educational agencies [] must include in its child find system, those
incarcerated youth who would be eligible to receive [a free
appropriate public education].”91 This includes those incarcerated
individuals that are below the age of eighteen in adult correctional
facilities.92 Thus, adult penal institutions are not entirely exempt
from child find procedures; inmates who have been previously
identified as children with disabilities, as well as those below the age
of eighteen, must be identified and evaluated for special education.93
Adult penal institutions, however, currently apply this provision
to circumvent their child find obligation to eligible individuals.94 The
institutional characteristics of prisons, with their punitive focus, do
not lend themselves to ensuring that the educational needs of its
inmates are met.95 Richard Morris and Kristin Thompson, professors
of special education and disability at the University of Arizona,
noted that, “it is frequently reported that . . . the school records of
incarcerated youths are difficult to obtain from their regular public
school to ensure continuity of needed services and IEP
implementation.”96 Additionally, confusion regarding the agency
88. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2004).
89. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii); see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56040(b) (West 2003); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.102(a)(2) (2008).
90. Letter from Stephanie Smith Lee, Dir., Office of Special Educ. & Rehab. Serv., U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., to Geoffrey A. Yudien, Legal Counsel, Vt. Dep’t of Educ. (Aug. 19, 2003)
[hereinafter IDEA Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/letters/2003-3/yudien081
903fape3q2003.pdf.
91. Id.
92. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004).
93. IDEA Letter, supra note 90, at 1–2.
94. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 8 n.20.
95. Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 235–38.
96. Richard J. Morris & Kristin C. Thompson, Juvenile Delinquency and Special Education
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responsible for the provision of special education often delays, if not
dispels, service delivery altogether.97 If adult correctional facilities
do not have a child find system in place, qualified individuals may be
denied a free appropriate public education simply because they
remain unidentified.98 Therefore, even though this provision allows
adult correctional facilities to dispense with their child find duty in
some limited instances, these institutions continue to have an
obligation to find unidentified, but qualified, individuals both above
and below eighteen years of age.99
Many adult correctional facilities, however, do not have child
find procedures in place.100 Indeed, this specific exception to the
IDEA mandate of special education has been criticized because
“[p]roper identification of youth with special education needs [and]
exposure to special education curriculum . . . should be available to
juveniles in adult prisons as well as those in juveniles facilities.”101
C. Modification of a Child’s IEP or Placement
Under the IDEA, a student’s IEP or placement can be modified
in light of certain demonstrated safety or penological
considerations.102 Specifically, the IDEA states that if a child with a
disability “is convicted as an adult under State law and incarcerated
in an adult prison, the child’s IEP Team may modify the child’s IEP
or placement . . . if the State has demonstrated a bona fide security or
compelling penological interest that cannot otherwise be
accommodated.”103
This provision differs from the exceptions discussed above in
two significant ways. First, it applies to youth of all ages incarcerated
Laws: Policy Implementation Issues and Directions for Future Research, 59 J. CORR. EDUC. 173,
175–76 (2008).
97. See also Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 2 (“Challenges such as overcrowding,
frequent transfers in and out of facilities, lack of qualified teachers, inability to address gaps in
students’ education, and lack of collaboration with the LEA contribute to the problem.”); cf.
Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 236–37 (discussing this issue in the context of juvenile
correctional facilities).
98. Cate, supra note 29, at 17 (“As young students’ disabilities are often undetected . . . this
provision has the potential to deny special education to a large number of incarcerated youth.”).
99. IDEA Letter, supra note 90, at 1–2.
100. See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 8.
101. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL
ASSESSMENT, 67 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf.
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1414 (2012); 34 C.F.R. § 300.324 (2012).
103. 34 C.F.R. § 300.324.
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in adult correctional facilities.104 If a penal institution demonstrates a
bona fide security or compelling penological interest, students’ IEPs
may be modified or abrogated.105 Second, it applies only to youth
who have already been convicted as adults under state law and
incarcerated in adult prisons.106 The provision does not apply to
youth in jails being held in pre-trial detention.107
Only one federal district court—the Middle District of
Pennsylvania in 2015—has analyzed this provision’s scope.108 In
Buckley v. State Correctional Institution-Pine Grove,109 the court
found that the “[u]se of the adjective ‘bona fide’ indicates that any
security interest must be actual or genuine to the student, as opposed
to theoretical.”110 Thus, the security interest must be particular to the
student and not based upon a blanket policy applicable to all inmates
at a certain security level.111
Moreover, “the established safety concern must be of such a
quality that it ‘cannot otherwise be accommodated.’”112 Buckley held
that “a student’s IEP must be implemented as drafted where a bona
fide security interest exists and can be accommodated.”113
Additionally, commentary by the Department of Education iterated
that a compelling security or penological interest does not include
budgetary or funding concerns: “States must accommodate the costs
and administrative requirements of educating all eligible individuals
with disabilities.”114
Even when a bona fide security or compelling penological
interest exists, however, this provision only grants correctional
facilities the ability to modify an existing IEP or placement.115 The

104. IDEA Letter, supra note 90, at 2.
105. Buckley v. State Corr. Inst.-Pine Grove, 98 F. Supp. 3d 704, 713 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
106. Id. at 715; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006) (“If a child with a disability is incarcerated,
but is not convicted as an adult under State law and is not incarcerated in an adult prison, the
requirements of the Act apply.”); IDEA Letter, supra note 90.
107. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 772 (Cal. 2013).
108. See Buckley, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 704.
109. 98 F. Supp. 3d 704 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
110. Id. at 715.
111. See 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,577 (Mar. 12, 1999) (“A definition of the terms ‘bona fide
security or compelling penological interest’ is not appropriate, given the individualized nature of
the determination and the countless variables that may impact on the determination.”).
112. Buckley, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 715.
113. Id. at 715–16.
114. 64 Fed. Reg. 12,537, 12,577 (Mar. 12, 1999).
115. Buckley, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 718.
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Buckley court held that the provision does not give IEP teams at adult
correctional facilities “carte blanche to denude an IEP of special
education services . . . . [A]n education program should be revised,
not annulled.”116 Accordingly, adult penal institutions that follow the
law may not terminate an individual’s right to special education
altogether.117 In reality, as the Buckley court noted, “youth with
disabilities, who are incarcerated at disproportionate rates, often are
denied their right to an appropriate education while
institutionalized.”118
D. Penalties in the Event of IDEA Violations
The IDEA provision concerning the consequences of an IDEA
violation in adult correctional facilitates is perhaps the most harmful
mechanism that adult prisons use in order to avoid providing a free
appropriate public education to IDEA-eligible inmates. Generally,
the state educational agency oversees all local educational agencies
within the state and ensures that they are in compliance with the
IDEA.119 If a local educational agency fails to provide a free
appropriate public education to eligible students, the state
educational agency shares the blame.120 However, in the case of adult
prisons:
[T]he Governor (or another individual pursuant to State
law), . . . may assign to any public agency in the State the
responsibility of ensuring that the requirements . . . are met
with respect to children with disabilities who are convicted
as adults under State law and incarcerated in adult
prisons.”121
States may transfer their supervisory responsibility for IDEA
compliance in adult correctional facilities to another agency, such as
the state department of corrections.122 Consequently, states’
responsibility, and more importantly, the consequences for IDEA
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 720.
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1416 (2012) (States are required to “monitor implementation of this
subchapter by local educational agencies; and enforce this part . . . .”).
120. Id. § 1416. For a review of all the enforcement mechanisms available to the Secretary of
Education, see 20 U.S.C. § 1416(d)–(e).
121. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(C) (2004).
122. Mayes, supra note 65, at 198.
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violations in the adult prison context, are severely abrogated.123
The Secretary of Education has limited disciplinary measures for
IDEA violations when an agency—other than the state educational
agency—is assigned responsibility for eligible students in adult
prisons:
[T]he Secretary . . . shall take appropriate corrective action
to ensure compliance with this subchapter, except that . . .
any reduction or withholding of payments to the State shall
be proportionate to the total funds allotted . . . to the State as
the number of eligible children with disabilities in adult
prisons under the supervision of the other public agency . . .
[and] any withholding of funds . . . shall be limited to the
specific agency responsible for the failure to comply with
this subchapter.124
The Secretary of Education’s withholding power is one of the
principal enforcement mechanisms to ensure IDEA compliance.125
But this power is limited where IDEA violations occur in the prison
context.126 Any funding reduction must be in an amount
proportionate to the number of eligible students under the agency’s
responsibility, relative to the total number of IDEA-eligible students
in the state.127 Thus, if the agency systematically violates the IDEA,
the state’s overall funding is not in jeopardy.128 In turn, adult penal
institutions have less motivation to provide special education to
eligible youth within their facilities.
It is important to note that the Secretary of Education’s power to
withhold is limited only to where youth are convicted and held in
adult prisons.129 As stated in Garcia, school-aged youth incarcerated
in adult jails, either pre-adjudication or afterward, are entitled to a
free appropriate public education provided by the local educational
agency where their parents reside.130
Nonetheless, adult correctional facilities use this exception, and
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (2004).
124. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(h) (2012).
125. Id. § 1416(e).
126. Id. § 1416(h); see id. § 1412(a)(11)(c).
127. Id. § 1416(h); Cate, supra note 29, at 19; see H.R. REP. NO. 105–649, at 3 (1998); 71
Fed. Reg. 46,540, 46,802 (Aug. 14, 2006).
128. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(h); Cate, supra note 29, at 19.
129. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(h).
130. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 775 (Cal. 2013).
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those discussed above, to circumvent providing school-aged youth in
their institutions with a free appropriate public education.131 While
some of these institutions adhere to the letter of the law, all fail to
observe the underlying principles of the IDEA—that a free
appropriate public education should be available to all children with
disabilities.132 Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that “education
has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We
cannot ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when
select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills
upon which our social order rests.”133
IV. TRANSFER LAWS AND THEIR SERIOUS EFFECTS ON YOUTH
Several IDEA provisions allow adult correctional facilities to
bypass the provision of special education to school-aged youth in
adult correctional facilities.134 But how do legal minors end up in the
“adult” criminal justice system in the first place? Normally, “[s]tate
juvenile courts with delinquency jurisdiction handle cases in which
‘juveniles’135 are accused of acts that would be crimes if ‘adults’
committed them.”136 Essentially, individuals accused of committing
crimes before the age of eighteen are usually under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile justice system.137 Those individuals accused of crimes
after they turn eighteen enter the criminal justice system.138
However, “[a]ll 50 states and the District of Columbia have legal
mechanisms for trying juveniles as adults in criminal court.”139 The
131. All four provisions of the IDEA discussed above are meant to restrict the provision of
special education in specific, limited circumstances.
132. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2004) (The purpose of this act is “to ensure that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for
further education, employment, and independent living.”).
133. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
134. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B) (2004); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7) (2012).
135. Here, the term “juvenile” is limited; it means legal minors below the age of eighteen
nationally, and below the age of seventeen in California.
136. Patrick Griffin et al., Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and
Reporting, JUV. OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: NAT. REP. SERIES, Sept. 2011, at 2, https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/232434.pdf.
137. Id.
138. Id.; see, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 603 (West 2015) (stating that juvenile courts
have original jurisdiction over individuals below the age of eighteen unless the alleged crime is
one listed in section 707.01 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code); CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 606 (West 2016) (stating that cases involving minors must be filed in juvenile court
unless other provisions apply).
139. Jason J. Washburn et al., Detained Youth Processed in Juvenile and Adult Court:
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different types of transfer laws and their particular forms in
California are discussed in subsection A.
Transfer laws increase the amount of incarcerated individuals in
adult penal institutions who are eligible for special education under
the IDEA. Subsection B explores the many negative consequences
associated with incarcerating youth in adult facilities. Moreover, in
light of the damaging effects of incarceration on youth, the provision
of special education in adult correctional facilities can help mitigate
these negative consequences.
A. Transfer Laws
There are three primary categories of transfer laws that can be
found in most states.140 These include, but are not limited to, judicial
waiver, prosecutorial waiver, and statutory exclusion laws.141
1. Judicial Waiver Laws
Judicial waiver laws permit juvenile courts to waive jurisdiction
for certain cases, thereby opening the way for criminal
prosecution.142 Waiver determinations are made at formal hearings
and require that minimum standards be met.143 Factors such as the
nature of the alleged crime and the accused individual’s “age,
maturity, history, and rehabilitative prospects” are taken into
account.144 Nevertheless, cases subject to waiver may usually be
transferred to a criminal court based on a judge’s discretion and
“[w]aiver thresholds are often quite low . . . .”145 Some states,
though, make waiver presumptive for certain crimes or else designate
specific sets of circumstances where waiver is mandatory.146
To illustrate, under presumptive waiver laws, “a juvenile who
meets age, offense, or other statutory thresholds . . . must present

Psychiatric Disorders and Mental Health Needs, JUV. JUST. BULL., Sept. 2015, at 2, http://www.
ojjdp.gov/pubs/248283.pdf.
140. Sarah Hockenberry & Charles Puzzanchera, Delinquency Cases Waived to Criminal
Court, 2011, JUV. OFFENDERS & VICTIMS: NAT. REP. SERIES, Dec. 2014, at 29, http://www.ojjdp.
gov/pubs/248410.pdf.
141. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 2.
142. Id. (“A total of 45 states have laws designating some category of cases in which waiver
of jurisdiction may be considered.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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evidence rebutting the presumption, or the court will grant waiver
and the case will be tried in criminal court.”147 Under mandatory
waiver laws, juvenile courts must waive jurisdiction over cases that
meet specific age, offense or prior record criteria.148 The court’s only
function under mandatory waiver laws is to ensure that the
requirements are met.149
In the past, judicial waiver was the primary mechanism that
juvenile courts used to transfer youth to criminal court.150 The
circumstances have changed today with the proliferation of other
transfer laws.151 Indeed, although the proportion of juvenile cases in
which prosecutors seek waiver is unknown,152 there has been a
definitive decline over the last decade in the number of cases that are
judicially waived to criminal court.153 Today, the primary methods
for transferring juveniles to the adult criminal justice system are
through prosecutorial discretion laws and statutory exclusion laws.154
In California, discretionary judicial waiver is available in any
case where a minor is accused of violating any criminal statute or
ordinance and is sixteen years of age or older.155 The juvenile court,
upon the prosecution’s motion, may consider whether the individual
is “a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court
law.”156 If the court finds that the minor is not amendable to the care
and services provided through juvenile justice system facilities, then
the court may waive the case to criminal court.157 This determination
is based on: the “degree of criminal sophistication” demonstrated by
the minor,158 “whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction,”159 “the minor’s
previous delinquent history,”160 and the “circumstances and gravity”

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 4. Presumptive waiver laws exist in fifteen states. Id.
Id.
Id. Fifteen states have mandatory waiver. Id.
Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 2.
Id.
Griffin et al., supra note 136.
Hockenberry & Puzzanchera, supra note 140, at 3.
Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 2.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(a) (West 2016).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 707(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 707(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 707(a)(1)(C).
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of the alleged offense.161
Additionally, although California does not have any mandatory
judicial waiver laws, its presumptive judicial waiver laws are quite
broad.162 Presumptive waiver is required where a minor has
previously committed murder or one of the statutorily enumerated
sex offenses, and is then accused of another felony offense when he
or she is over the age of sixteen.163 In those cases, a minor shall be
presumed not “a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the
juvenile court law,” unless the juvenile court concludes, based on
evidence, that the individual would be amendable to the care and
services available through the juvenile justice system.164 This
determination is based on the same factors considered in
discretionary waiver but the standard is much stricter.165 The court
must make a favorable finding as to every factor listed.166 However,
presumptive waiver only applies if the minor is found to have
committed two or more felony offenses when he or she was above
the age of fourteen.167 Overall, from 2003 to 2008, 40% of
documented transfers in California were through judicial waivers.168
2. Prosecutorial Discretion Laws
Prosecutorial discretion laws, also known as concurrent
jurisdiction laws, refer to the types of cases that may be brought in
either the juvenile justice system or the criminal justice system
depending on prosecutorial discretion.169 For these types of cases, a
hearing is not necessary to determine which court is appropriate as
there may be little or no formal standards for making that decision.170
In California, the prosecutor may choose to file a case in a
criminal court if the alleged offense was committed by a minor aged
sixteen or above and if the alleged offense is one of the crimes listed
161. Id. § 707(a)(1)(E).
162. See Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 3.
163. See WELF. & INST. § 707(a)(2).
164. Id. § 707(a)(2)(B).
165. See id. § 707(a)(2)(B).
166. Id. § 707(a)(2)(B).
167. Id. § 707(a)(2)(A).
168. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 18–19. But “currently, only 13 states publicly report the
total number of their transfers.” Id. at 1.
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 2–5 (“[P]rosecutorial discretion laws are usually silent regarding standards,
protocols, or appropriate considerations for decision making.”). But see WELF. & INST. § 707(d)
(enumerating standards and protocols for prosecutorial discretion in California).
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in subdivision (b) section 707 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code.171 Additionally, the prosecutor may file a case in
criminal court if the minor is above the age of sixteen and has not
currently committed one of the listed crimes, but has previously
committed one.172 Moreover, the prosecutor has discretion to file a
case in criminal court for minors above the age of fourteen when
certain circumstances apply.173
3. Statutory Exclusion Laws
Statutory exclusion laws, also known as automatic transfers,
“exclude juveniles from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court solely
on the basis of the type of offense, criminal history, and age of the
youth.”174 Thus, criminal courts gain exclusive jurisdiction over
certain crimes involving juvenile offenders; if the case “falls within a
statutory exclusion category, it must be filed originally in criminal
court.”175 Murder and sexual crimes are the most common types of
offenses designated in statutory exclusion laws.176 Twenty-nine
states have statutes that exclude juveniles from the jurisdiction of
juvenile courts simply because they meet threshold requirements
such as age, offense, or prior record criteria.177
Subsection (b) of section 602 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code describes California’s policy on automatic
transfers. The provision states that if any person fourteen years of
age or older is accused of committing murder or certain listed sex
offenses, he or she must be prosecuted under state criminal law in the
“adult” criminal justice system.178
Thus, school-aged youth may be tried as adults through legal
mechanisms including judicial waiver, prosecutorial discretion, or

171. WELF. & INST. § 707(d).
172. Id.
173. See id. § 707(d)(2) (providing an in-depth review of the circumstances in which a
prosecutor has discretion to file cases in criminal court for individuals ages fourteen and above).
174. Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 2.
175. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 2.
176. Id. at 6; Campaign for Youth Justice, The Consequences Aren’t Minor: The Impact of
Trying Youth as Adults and Strategies for Reform, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 23 (Mar. 21,
2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJNR_ConsequencesMinor.pdf
(District attorneys are required to “file cases in adult criminal court for minors age 14 and older
charged with either murder with special circumstances . . . or certain enumerated sex offenses.”).
177. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 6.
178. WELF. & INST. § 602(b).
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statutory exclusion.179 The minimum age that youth may be
transferred to the “adult” criminal justice system varies between
states, but is fourteen in California.180 Additionally, any juvenile
above the age of sixteen may be tried as an adult for any offense in
California.181 Transfer laws have an extensive effect on the overall
criminal justice system, in part because the incarceration of youth in
adult correctional facilities is associated with negative outcomes for
school-aged youth.182
B. The Consequences of Sentencing Youth as Adults
National and state data are “fragmentary” on the numbers of
school-aged youth incarcerated in adult jails and prisons.183 This is in
part because there is no national dataset that tracks the amount of
cases that are transferred to adult courts.184 Lower estimates of
minors incarcerated in adult jails range from 4,000 to 7,500.185
However, some researchers suggest that the actual number of
juveniles held in adult jails “may be ten to twenty times higher than
the daily estimate, given ‘turnover rates’ of youth funneled in and out
of the system.”186 Additionally, little to no data has been collected
concerning the number of juveniles incarcerated in adult correctional
facilities besides jails.187 However, while the numbers are
ambiguous, it is clear that a significant minority of school-aged
youth188 in the United States are being held and incarcerated in adult
179. The Consequences Aren’t Minor: The Impact of Trying Youth as Adults and Strategies
for Reform, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 5 (Mar. 21, 2007), http://www.campaignforyouth
justice.org/documents/CFYJNR_ConsequencesMinor.pdf [hereinafter Campaign for Youth
Justice].
180. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 211 (West 2016).
181. Id. § 707(a).
182. See, e.g., Ziedenberg, supra note 13, at 19−20.
183. Griffin et al., supra note 136, at 12.
184. Id.
185. Compare Ely, supra note 25, at 797 (“Approximately 7,500 youths under eighteen are
held in adult jails every day across the country.”), with Todd D. Minton & Zhen Zeng, Bureau of
Just. Stat., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Jail Inmates at Midyear 2014, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL.,
June 11, 2015, at 1, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf (“About 4,200 juveniles age
17 or younger were held in local jails at midyear 2014.”).
186. Ely, supra note 25, at 798.
187. Id. In 2005, 4,775 youth under eighteen were incarcerated each day in state prisons.
However, this number is under-inclusive because it does not include youth incarcerated in federal
prisons and little information has been collected on the number of youth, aged eighteen to twentytwo, that are incarcerated in state and federal prisons. Id.
188. The term “school-aged youth” is used here to refer to both minors and those individuals
above the age of eighteen that are still entitled to rights under the IDEA.
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jails and prisons.189
There are a number of negative consequences associated with
incarcerating youth in adult correctional facilities.190 Studies have
confirmed that youth incarcerated in adult correctional facilities are
more likely to reoffend than those retained in the juvenile justice
system.191 Indeed, placing youth in adult correctional facilities often
results in distorted attitudes towards antisocial behavior and an
increased association with more “hardened” criminals.192
Moreover, incarceration in adult facilities is expensive.193 In
California, it costs about $674.55 a day or $246,210 a year to confine
a young person.194 Additionally, the danger of self-harm, assault, and
the occurrence of mental health conditions is much greater for youth
in adult facilities.195 Indeed, “incarcerated youth experience from
double to four times the suicide rate of youth in the community.”196
Furthermore, there is a severe racial disparity in the demographics of
youth that get transferred to adult criminal courts.197 Historically,
racial and ethnic minority groups, particularly those from lower
socio-economic classes, represent a disproportionate amount of
juveniles transferred to the adult criminal justice system.198
189. Davis et al., supra note 12, at 21 (“In 2011, about 61,000 individuals below age 21 were
incarcerated on any given day in the United States.”).
190. See, e.g., Ziedenberg, supra note 13 (discussing the safety, service, and cost challenges
that arise when youth are detained in jails while awaiting trial).
191. Neelum Arya, Legislative Victories from 2005 to 2010: Removing Youth from the Adult
Criminal Justice System, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 17 (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.
campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf. (“[Y]outh who are
transferred . . . to the adult criminal system are approximately 34% more likely than youth
retained in the juvenile court system to be rearrested for violent or other crimes.”). For more
information on the recidivism rates of youth incarcerated in adult correctional facilities, see, for
example, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS:
2014 NATIONAL REPORT, 111–12 (2014), http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2014/downloads/NR
2014.pdf.
192. Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America,
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST. 7–8 (Nov. 2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/
documents/CFYJNR_JailingJuveniles.pdf [hereinafter Jailing Juveniles].
193. See HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 27, at 10–11.
194. Factsheet: The Tip of the Iceberg: What Taxpayers Pay to Incarcerate Youth, JUST.
POL’Y INST. 2 (Mar. 2015), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/
factsheet_costs_of_confinement.pdf.
195. See Jailing Juveniles, supra note 192.
196. HOLMAN & ZIEDENBERG, supra note 27, at 9.
197. See SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST.,
DEP’T
OF
JUST.,
JUVENILE
COURT
STATISTICS
2013
20–27
(2015),
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/jcsreports/jcs2013.pdf.
198. Washburn et al., supra note 139, at 3.

2017]

SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR INMATES

117

This Note’s discussion concerning the negative effects of
incarceration on juveniles is nowhere near exhaustive. Numerous
advocacy groups have discussed the adverse consequences of
transfer laws and their effect on America’s juvenile population.199
However, there has been limited dialogue concerning education,
particularly special education, and its ability to mitigate many of the
negative consequences of incarceration in adult prisons.200
“Although many factors account for why some formerly
incarcerated adults and youth succeed and some don’t, lack of
education and skills is one key reason.”201 Conversely, improved
school performance is associated with a reduction in criminality and
delinquency.202 Moreover, researchers have found that a
disproportionate amount of incarcerated youth have learning
disabilities and are in need of special education.203 Not only would
providing special education to youth incarcerated in adult
correctional facilities substantially reduce recidivism rates,204 it
would also be more cost effective.205 Davis suggests that there would
be a “savings of five dollars on reincarceration costs for every dollar
spent on correctional education.”206 Special education in adult
correctional facilities also emphasizes the potential for rehabilitation
and strengthens the criminal justice system’s deterrence goals.207
In theory, youth incarcerated in adult jails and prisons have the
opportunity for a structured environment emphasizing learning and
future planning.208 As argued throughout this Note, however, special
199. See Campaign for Youth Justice, supra note 179, at 23.
200. See Davis et al., supra note 12, at iii (“Correctional education . . . reduces the risk of
post-release reincarceration . . . and does so cost-effectively . . . . And when it comes to postrelease employment for adults . . . researchers find that correctional education may increase such
employment.”).
201. Id.
202. KATHERINE A. CARLSON & MICHELLE M. MAIKE, OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB.
INSTRUCTION, WASH., EDUCATING JUVENILES IN ADULT JAILS: A PROGRAM GUIDE 12 (2013),
http://www.k12.wa.us/InstitutionalEd/pubdocs/EducatingJuvenilesInAdultJails.pdf.
203. Davis et al., supra note 12, at 22 (“[B]etween 30 and 50 percent of incarcerated youth
have special education disabilities, as compared with approximately 10 percent of nonincarcerated youth.”).
204. Ely, supra note 25, at 807; Davis et al., supra note 12, at iii.
205. Davis et al., supra note 12, at iii.
206. Id.
207. Mayes, supra note 65, at 208–09.
208. Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 8, at 1 (“[T]he fact that a student has been charged
with or convicted of a crime does not diminish his or her substantive rights or the procedural
safeguards and remedies provided under the IDEA to students with disabilities and their
parents.”).
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education in the adult correctional facility context does not meet
minimally adequate standards.209 Indeed, adult penal institutions
“may fail to offer educational programs at all, may provide programs
run by entities ill-equipped to educate school-aged youth, or may
have insufficient resources to provide appropriate services.”210 As of
2000, only 40% of state prisons, 60% of federal prisons, 22% of
private prisons, and 11% of jails provided special education
programs to their inmates.211 Thus, despite federal statutes and state
constitutional prerogatives, adult correctional facilities continue to
violate the educational rights of incarcerated juveniles.212
V. LEGISLATION AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
The adequate provision of special education to eligible juveniles
incarcerated in adult facilities is currently inadequate. Individuals
below the age of eighteen, and those between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-two, experience institutional reluctance when attempting
to obtain the free appropriate public education to which they are
entitled. However, this is not a new phenomenon.213 For years,
advocates have been trying to bring the provision of special
education in adult correctional facilities up to minimally adequate
levels.214
There are many possible avenues to improve upon the provision
of special education in adult correctional facilities.215 This Note
argues for legislation as a solution to this issue.
Because much of special education law is rooted in statutes,
legislative advocacy is an essential tool for advocates against special
education inadequacy in adult correctional facilities.216 Activists
need to argue for clarification and reduction of the IDEA exceptions
so that adult penal institutions will not improperly broaden their
scope. For example, in its current state, the statutory framework for
the IDEA differentiates between individuals incarcerated in adult
209. Ely, supra note 25, at 809–11.
210. Id. at 801.
211. Harlow, supra note 24, at 4.
212. See Jailing Juveniles, supra note 192, at 4.
213. Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 235.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 272–74 (arguing for more research to
develop effective ways of incentivizing correctional facilities to comply with the law); Ely, supra
note 25, at 828–32 (arguing for school finance litigation “adequacy” claims).
216. Cate, supra note 29, at 35.
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correctional facilities and those incarcerated in juvenile correctional
facilities.217 Its measures limit the provision of special education for
those individuals incarcerated in adult, but not juvenile, facilities.218
However, this distinction is unrealistic. As discussed above, the
decision to transfer youth to the adult criminal justice system is often
discretionary.219 This discretion, in turn, permits judicial officers and
prosecutors to decide the quality of education that juveniles will
receive; the decision to prosecute juveniles as adults and incarcerate
them in adult facilities is a decision that currently delivers these
individuals to institutions with inadequate special education
services.220
Additionally, the IDEA limitations discussed above are not
compatible with the overall purpose of the IDEA, which asserts that
all youth with disabilities are entitled to a free appropriate public
education.221 Moreover, as currently utilized, adult correctional
facilities use these IDEA limitations to eliminate the provision of
special education altogether.222 As such, amending the IDEA to
clarify and reduce the four IDEA loophole provisions would improve
outcomes for all juveniles with disabilities and ensure compliance
with the overall purpose of the IDEA.
First, the “inconsistent with State law or practice”223 exception
should be amended to ensure that the Tunstall example is not
followed.224 The statutory language of this provision needs to clearly
217. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i) (2004) (allowing states to limit the provision of
special education if it would be inconsistent with state law or practice), id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii)
(exempting adult correctional facilities from the child find obligation in limited circumstances),
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012) (allowing modifications of an incarcerated individual’s IEP in
certain circumstances), and id. § 1416(h) (limiting the withholding power of the Secretary of
Education in the context of adult penal institutions), with CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 224.71
(West 2016) (promising all individuals incarcerated in juvenile facilities a quality education that
complies with state law).
218. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii) (2004).
219. See discussion supra Part IV (detailing the different types of transfer laws and how they
are applied).
220. See Ziedenberg, supra note 13, at 23 (“With the adult conviction they get no services,
education . . . . The [juveniles tried as adults] population does not belong to anyone . . . neither
adult nor juvenile.”).
221. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2004).
222. See supra notes 11–17 and accompanying text (discussing the current state of special
education in adult correctional facilities).
223. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i).
224. Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691, 708 (Wash. 2000) (holding that students in adult
correctional facilities over the age of eighteen are ineligible for the provision of special education
under the IDEA).
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pronounce that states are permitted to limit the provision of special
education to particular age groups but not merely to subsets within
age groups. Thus, a state can decide that providing special education
for all individuals above the age of eighteen is “inconsistent with
state law or practice.”225 However, under this provision, states may
not limit the provision of special education to those individuals
above the age of eighteen in adult correctional facilities, without
restricting this right to individuals not incarcerated in adult
correctional facilities.226
Second, the provision limiting the child find obligation in adult
correctional facilities should be eliminated altogether.227 In its
current state, this provision allows adult penal institutions to dispel
with their child find obligation for those individuals above the age of
eighteen who have not previously been identified as a child with a
disability.228 However, without active child find systems in place,
many eligible students are denied special education simply because
they remain unidentified.229 Eliminating this exception to the
provision of a free appropriate public education would ensure greater
compliance with IDEA requirements.230 Additionally, by requiring
these institutions to find and assess the needs of youth within their
facilities, officials would have a greater understanding of the needs
of their inmate population. Thus, appropriate services can be
provided to meet these needs and enhance the outcomes of these
individuals.231
Third, the IDEA provision allowing a student’s IEP or
placement to be modified in light of certain demonstrated “bona fide
security or compelling penological interests”232 is acceptable so long
as adult correctional facilities comply with the provision’s intended
225. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(i).
226. Mayes, supra note 65, at 201.
227. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii).
228. Id. § 1412(a)(1)(B)(ii).
229. See Sheldon-Sherman, supra note 29, at 236–38; see also Morris & Thompson, supra
note 96, at 178 (discussing the difficulty of implementing child find policies and procedures in a
correctional setting.).
230. By requiring adult correctional facilities to identify and assess all potentially eligible
individuals within their institution, those individuals eligible under the current statutory scheme
would be identified, and, under the IDEA, they must be provided with special education.
231. Davis et al., supra note 12, at iv (“[T]he debate should no longer be about whether
correctional education is effective or cost-effective but rather on where the gaps in our knowledge
are and opportunities to move the field forward.”).
232. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(7)(B) (2012).
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scope.233 The Buckley decision provided a reasonable explanation
concerning the scope of this provision.234 Adult penal institutions
must first demonstrate that the compelling safety or penological
consideration is specific to the individual.235 They must then show
that such a concern cannot be accommodated through reasonable
means other than modifying the juvenile’s IEP.236 As such, adult
penal institutions that follow the law may only modify a juvenile’s
IEP in specific, limited circumstances.
Lastly, the IDEA provision limiting the Secretary of Education’s
withholding power in the event of IDEA violations in adult prisons
needs to be eliminated.237 The Secretary of Education’s withholding
power is one of the principal enforcement mechanisms to ensure
IDEA compliance.238 Without the threat of such a penalty, adult
correctional institutions can violate the IDEA without losing a
significant portion of their federal IDEA funding.239 Thus, many of
these institutions take this minimal forfeiture rather than creating
special education programs in their institutions.240 With the removal
of this provision, such institutions would be pressured to ensure
compliance with the IDEA or risk losing their federal IDEA funding
altogether.
In short, the IDEA provisions that allow adult correctional
facilities to limit the provision of special education to youth
incarcerated in their institutions need to be modified and their scope
clarified. Ideally, this would occur on the federal level, with the
IDEA being amended. However, advocates may have a greater
chance of success if they first attempt to modify the California
statutes implementing the IDEA. California has expressed the intent
to neither enlarge nor abrogate the rights expressed in the federal
IDEA.241 However, the California Constitution affords greater

233. See Buckley v. State Corr. Inst.-Pine Grove, 98 F. Supp. 3d 704, 713 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
234. Id. at 715–20.
235. Id. at 715–16.
236. Id.
237. 20 U.S.C. § 1416(h) (2004).
238. Id. § 1416(e).
239. Id. § 1416(h).
240. See Stephan, supra note 11, at 5–6. Fewer than 40% of adult prisons and jails currently
have special education programs. Id. This number would be much higher if the states where they
resided were threatened with losing a significant portion of their federal IDEA funding.
241. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56000 (West 2003).
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educational protection than does the U.S. Constitution.242 Moreover,
Garcia suggests that California lawmakers may be open to such
legislation.243
VI. CONCLUSION
The provision of special education is a right guaranteed to all
eligible youth within the United States.244 However, for a substantial,
but largely unacknowledged population, it is a right they are not
receiving. Four specific IDEA provisions limit the provision of
special education in adult correctional facilities for certain
individuals.245 However, expansive use of these supposedly limited
exceptions coalesces to create a substantial lack of special education
programs in adult penal institutions. Legislation amending the IDEA
is necessary at the federal level in order to ensure that these
loopholes are closed for all juveniles incarcerated in adult
correctional facilities nationwide. However, until this occurs,
California should attempt to modify and clarify these provisions so
that juveniles within the state of California are accorded their
constitutional rights. As “the denial of appropriate education
undoubtedly serves to perpetuate a vicious circle of incarceration for
this at-risk population . . . the provision of a meaningful educational
benefit may yet interrupt it.”246

242. See discussion supra Section II.A (discussing the California constitution and the
educational protections it affords its residents).
243. See L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 314 P.3d 767, 780 (Cal. 2013). Garcia held that
qualified individuals under the IDEA had rights to the provision of adequate special education in
county jail. Id. Although this holding was limited to county jails, it suggests that the California
Supreme Court and lawmakers may be open to clarifying the statutory scheme implementing the
IDEA. See id.
244. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1) (2004).
245. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii), 1414(d)(7)(B), 1416(h).
246. Buckley v. State Corr. Inst.-Pine Grove, 98 F. Supp. 3d 704, 720 (M.D. Pa. 2015).

